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Handbook of the history of logic, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods, Volume 1:
Greek, Indian and Arabic logic. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2004, viii + 618 pp.—therein:
Julius Moravcsik. Logic before Aristotle: development or birth? Pp. 1–26
John Woods and Andrew Irvine. Aristotle’s early logic. Pp. 27–100
George Boger. Aristotle’s underlying logic. Pp. 101–246
Fred Johnson. Aristotle’s modal syllogisms. Pp. 247–308
Jonardon Ganeri. Indian logic. Pp. 309–396
Robert R. O’Toole andRaymond E. Jennings. TheMegarians and the Stoics. Pp. 397–
522
Tony Street. Arabic logic. Pp. 523–596
Charles Burnett. The translation of Arabic works on logic into Latin in the Middle Ages
and Renaissance. Pp. 597–606
This is the ﬁrst book in a series of several large volumes on the history of logic. This series
adresses “ . . . members of the research communities in logic, history of logic and philosophy
of logic, as well as those in kindred areas such as computer science, artiﬁcial intelligence,
cognitive psychology, argumentation theory and history of ideas . . . The Handbook of the
history of logic aims at being a deﬁnitive research work for any member of the relevant
research communities” (from the Preface). — The ﬁrst volume has, in accordance with
its title, three main areas: Greek Logic (Aristotelian logic, Stoic logic — ﬁve articles, 437
pages), Arabic logic (two articles, 83 pages), Indian logic (one article of 85 pages). Thus this
Handbook continues with a tradition, which was begun by Bochen´ski, of including a certain
amount of discussion on non-European logic. Indian and Arabian logic are very diﬀerent in
this respect: Whilst Arabian logic is a direct oﬀspring of Greek logic and, since the Middle
ages, has entered the main stream of European logic once again, Indian logic is considered to
have grown up independently of the Greek tradition. Let us remark that this volume of the
Handbook of the history of logic does not contain any information on the only logic which is
based on a non-Indo-European language: Chinese logic. Wewill return to this point later on.
There are inherent obstacles impedingourunderstandingof the achievements of our logical
ancestors. The work of many a great logician suﬀered from serious interpretative faults of
posterity. Aristotelian Logic has been the main target for misleading interpretational attacks
for more than 2000 years, and Stoic logic has undergone a continuous maltreatment almost
up to the present day. Concerning the Stoics, O’Toole and Jennings, in theirmasterful chapter
in the book under review, point to the problematic role of historians of logic like Prantl and
Zeller who had not enough formal background and interest to enable them to diﬀerentiate
between the Aristotelian logic of terms and the Stoic logic of propositions. Today, in the age
of mathematical logic, we frequently meet another kind ofmisinterpretation of ancient logics,
committed even by outstanding logicians (and historians!) like Łukasiewicz and Bochen´ski:
It is not that we know too little of formal and symbolic systems, but, on the contrary, “ . . .
that there is a danger that the historian of logic possessing this requisite of mathematical logic
may allow his or her familiarity with the discipline to obscure, or even distort, the historical
enterprise” (p. 398). Thus, O’Toole and Jennings try to “ . . . attempt an interpretation of
Stoic logic less coloured by a reverence for modern formal systems, and more in harmony
with what the texts seem to indicate as being the place of logic in the Stoic system as a whole”
(p. 400). This statement could serve as a motto for the whole handbook series!
The ﬁrst chapter by J. Moravcsik, “Logic before Aristotle: Development or Birth?” gives
some answers to the question “was there logic before Aristotle in Western Culture?” The
author traces the development of what was a necessary background for logic as a formal
discipline, relying on the work of Bruno Snell, under the general headline “from myth to
logic”. The paper concentrates on a discussion of concepts and vocabulary presupposed by
logic (Chapter 1), gives an account of the links between logic and deﬁnition (Chapter 2) and,
in the last chapter, elaborates on the diﬀerences between Plato’s Method of Division and
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Aristotle’s logical deduction. The summary of the paper contains the following sentences:
“Our main point is that the rise of logic is both a matter of development and the matter of
instantaneous creation. The required vocabulary must have a historical process preceding it.
Once that is in place, the possibility of constructing a logic is there” (p. 21).
In the second chapter, “Aristotle’s Early Logic”, John Woods and Andrew Irvine focus
on Aristotle’s works Topics and On Sophistical refutations. They assert “ . . . that the logical
theory of theAnalytica Priora presupposes Aristotle’s theory of syllogisms . . . These theories
appear implicitly in the Topics and On Sophistical refutation” (p. 34). The authors consider
the works within the Organon, the Categories and On interpretation, not to be about logic
at all, so it is only consequent that they exclude them from discussion within their paper on
Aristotle’s Early Logic. Let me just remark that only few experts in the ﬁeld would ascribe
to this point of view; however, we cannot step into the details here. (See the review of David
Hitchcock, which is to appear in Argumentation vol. 18 (2004), regarding John Woods book
Aristotle’s earlier logic, Oxford: Hermes Science, 2001, from which signiﬁciant parts of the
chapter are drawn).
The third chapter by George Boger, “Aristotle’s Underlying Logic”, is the central one
on Aristotle’s logic within this volume. Boger says “Our concern here is to present Aris-
totle’s system of logic while also revealing the mathematical sophistication of his logical
investigations” (p. 113) which shows that his work belongs to the line of research begun
by Łukasiewicz and continued by Smiley and Corcoran. Boger neither overemphasizes the
value of symbolic representation of his ﬁndings nor restricts himself too much to a pure
philological inquiry into Aristotle’s works. — The chapter begins with a presentation of
Aristotle’s early work, the Categories, On interpretation, andMetaphysics which are the very
basis for everything Aristotle writes on the subject of logic later on in his Prior analytics.
The basic concepts comprise the two types of declarative sentence, namely, kataphasis and
apophasis, their connection to the four categorial sentence patterns (probleˆmata) , and the
notions of contradiction and contraries (hai antiphaseis and ta enantia). Let us note that
Boger’s presentation does not completely solve the problem of the exact relation of Aristotle’s
Categories to the Prior analytics: Whilst, in theCategories, the roles of subject and predicates
in a proposition are by no means symmetrical, the whole formalism of the syllogistic relies
on the interchangeability of the subject and predicate of a proposition. Thus, there is no
“smooth transition” from the early works of Aristotle to the formal system of the Analytica
Priora, and this certainly requires further research eﬀorts. — The next subsection deals with
the semantics of Aristotelian logic, and the following main part of the chapter is concerned
withAristotle’s formal systemof deduction, comprising— in addition to the elements already
mentioned — three conversion rules, 14 syllogism rules, and two kinds (direct and indirect)
of deduction. Boger presents his investigations into Aristotle’s system within a kind of a sys-
tem of natural deduction, thus following the “deductionist” way of interpretation, begun by
Smiley and Corcoran in the 1970’s. This interpretation accords much more to the text of the
Prior analytics than Łukasiewicz’ “axiomatic” formalism, published in his groundbreaking
book from 1950. — Boger then describes the processes of completion (teleiousthai), which
Aristotle utilizes in order to show that 10 of the 14 categorical syllogistic rules are — in
modern terms — derived rules in the sense that they can be shown to be valid by deducing
them from the four “basic” syllogisms of the ﬁrst ﬁgure. This set of four basic syllogisms
shrinks further (Pr. An. A 7) by Aristotle’s proof that two of the syllogism rules of the ﬁrst
ﬁgure, Darii and Ferio, can also be completed — indirectly (by reductio ad absurdum) — to
Barbara andCelarent. Boger emphasises the diﬀerences between the processes of completion,
reduction, and analysis, however, his lines of distinction would deserve a detailled discussion
which cannot be given here. This holds especially for his relatively short description of the
process of “analysis”, a concept which we believe can only be fully understood by diving
deeper into Book B of the Prior analytics. The chapter also contains a detailed section on
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Aristotle’s method of showing the inconcludence of “patterns not resulting in a syllogism”.
Boger’s tables on this subject (pp. 198, 199, 200) will probably become the standard reference
to this part of Aristotle’s logic. – The whole chapter will be of interest to a wide audience,
and its careful style of examination may be considered as a prototype for a thorough research
on an ancient logic and as a solid basis for further research.
Fred Johnson’s chapter on “Aristotle’s Modal Syllogisms” is the continuation of a line of
formal interpretation of Aristotle’s logic which was begun by Łukasiewicz. Johnson starts by
presenting Łukasiewicz’s formal system for assertoric syllogistics, and he then explains his
theory of rejection. The main part of the chapter is concerned with the syntax and semantics
of modern modal systems which are more or less capable of reproducing Aristotle’s results
on modal syllogisms (Johnson introduces an “index of Aristotelicity” of a formal system).
Whilst this chapter — in particular the extensive occupation with semantics — is of eminent
value for researchers in the ﬁeld of mathematical methods in modal logic, historians of
Aristotle’s logic, however, will probably not feel satisﬁed. Johnson’s approach shares all
the disadvantages of Łukasiewicz’ method, which does not aim to conform as much as
possible to the classical text but to invent an axiomatic system which produces as many
classical theorems as possible. Thus Johnson’s interesting chapter is more a contribution to
the history and theory of modern formal interpretation of Aristotle’s modal system than an
article on Aristotle’s modal system itself.
Chapter ﬁve contains the sole article on non-European logic within this volume, and, as
it seems, within the whole series. J. Ganeri’s chapter, entitled “Indian Logic” thus covers an
immense amount of material, ranging from ancient Nya¯ya logic of some centuries B.C. until
the Navya Nya¯ya of the middle ages (about 1300 AD). This is a project which, from the very
concept, could not, and, in fact, did not succeed. Indian logic is not just an appendix to
European logic, and it is not adequate to add an Indian ﬁg leaf to a western-oriented “History
ofLogic”. One should be aware of the fact that the Indian rooted logic provides uswith formal
logic systems which are not based on the Greek tradition, and this should be considered as
an opportunity to critically reﬂect on our own tradition and the self-conception of our
logic. However, this would require a careful discussion of the historical and philosophical
background of Indian logic. In contrast to this, Ganeri’s chapter “Indian Logic” is an
attempt to provide a Western reader with a set of highlights of Indian logic and to show how
these topics can be framed into certain systems of formal symbolic logical environments.
Section 1 is on argumentation and debate, containing the “ﬁve-membered Indian syllogism”,
Section 2 on the Buddhist trairu¯pya theory and Din˙na¯ga’s ’wheel of reasons’ (hetucakra),
Section 3 on Jaina logic, and Section 4 on logic inNavya–Nya¯ya. Within each section, Ganeri
utilises a diﬀerent system of symbolic logic in order to make the Indian ideas understandable
to Western readers: He uses standard predicate logic in Section 1, the theory of classes in
Section 2, a kind of “assertion logic” in Section 3, and a graph-theoretical formalism in
Section 4. While this appears to be helpful for a reader who is experiencing his ﬁrst contact
with Indian logic, one should always be aware of the danger of imputing ideas from our own
modern logic into an ancient system. — It is certainly not possible to do justice to Ganeri’s
chapter on Indian logic within this overall review. Nevertheless, I will add three critical
remarks regarding the content of the paper. The ﬁrst one is on Ganeri’s formalisation of the
“ﬁve-step schema” of the Nya¯yasu¯tra. Quite in the tradition of St. Schayer, Ganeri speaks
of the schema as “ﬁve-step proof” (p. 324), thus taking for granted that the Naiya¯yikas
disposed of a concept of a deductive system like we have today. In addition, Ganeri makes no
mention about the discrepancy between his own interpretation on pp. 324–6 and Schayer’s
interpretation on p. 327, which is radically diﬀerent with respect to the meaning of the fourth
step (application, upanaya). — The second remark concerns subsection 2.1. Here the author
employs a notational system which is not precise: He does not make a distinction between
symbols for classes (or sets) and properties which deﬁne these classes. On p. 343, he writes
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about a “property S”, and some lines below he writes “A reason property forS is anymember
of the class X : X =  & X  nonS = .” Thus, we have a property, a class, and
members of this class, but there is no precise notational diﬀerentiation between these types.
The third remark concerns Din˙na¯ga’s hetucakra in Section 2. Here Ganeri does not utilise
symbolic methods which would have been of some help. The hetucakra is one of the few
examples in Indian logic where there is a very clear formal structure which cries out for a
symbolic representation. However, I do not blame Ganeri for not having employed symbolic
tools, but for having given an incomplete representation of the content of the hetucakra:
In his Figure 3 on p. 346, a complete column is missing. This column should contain, in
rows 4–9, Din˙na¯ga’s six examples for which h (hetu) is missing, but s (sa¯dhya) is present:
space – space – space – space – lightning – atom (see Chatterji’s translation of the hetucakra,
cited in the bibliography of the article under review).
“TheMegarians and the Stoics” by Robert R. O’Toole and Raymond E. Jennings is one of
the central chapters of this handbook. To be precise, the essay is concerned mainly with the
logical doctrines of the Early Stoa (Zeno, Kleanthes, and Chrysippus). The authors begin
with comments on the history of misunderstandings and misconceptions of Stoic logic by
historians like Prantl and Zeller as well as by Łukasiewicz, Mates, Bochen´ski, the Kneales
and others. “The obstacle for both the later and earlier writers, it seems to us, is that they
have allowed their preconceptions to obscure their understanding” (p. 399). One of the
main assertions of the authors is that “ . . . it is surely false that the logical connectives
which appear in the Stoic syllogisms were in general deﬁned as binary connectives” (p. 398).
O’Toole and Jennings show meticulously how the ediﬁce of Stoic logic is founded on Stoic
ethics, epistemology, ontology and their understanding of semantics and inference. The
authors go deep into a discussion of the role of lekta, pragma and axio¯mata as a prerequisite
for the understanding of the building blocks of Stoic formal logic. It is impossible, at this
point, to review this chapter of the handbook — it certainly deserves a separate review. This
article will probably become the standard reference for anyone interested in Stoic logic.
The last two chapters of the Handbook are devoted to Arabic logic. Tony Street’s chapter
“Arabic Logic” should, in the words of the author (p. 526), more precisely be titled as
“Peripatetic logical writings in Arabic produced in the realms of Islam between 750 and 1350,
with special reference to the syllogistic.” The chapter contains sections on “The Translation
of the Organon”, “Alfarabi and Avicenna”, “Logic and the Islamic Disciplines” and “Logic
after Avicenna”. Besides an extensive Biibliography, there are appendices A: “Avicenna’s
Modals”, B: “Later Modal Logic”, and C: “Bibliographical Notes”. This chapter is an
excellent introduction into the subject and a starting point for further research.
Charles Burnett’s short (10 pages) interesting chapter titled “The Translation of Arabic
Works on Logic into Latin in the Middle Ages and Renaissance” gives answers to the
question: Why was there any need to translate the texts of the Organon from Arabic into
Latin during the twelfth and thirteenth century, given that Latin scholars “ . . . already had
good translations of at least the ﬁrst half of the Organon . . . , made by Boethius in the early
sixth century. And, when they wished to complete the Organon, they were able to do so by
translating the texts directly from the Greek” (p. 597)?
Let me add some remarks concerning the concept and realization of this Volume 1 of
the “Handbook”. In their short Preface, the editors write about the freedom given to the
authors “ . . . to develop their own interpretation of things.” It goes without saying that
such a liberal approach has not only advantages. Concerning the subject of “Indian Logic”,
this approach was not successful, as we tried to show in our review of the corresponding
chapter. Indian logic, together with its oﬀsprings based on Buddhist logic in Tibet and
China, is such a vast subject that it would deserve a volume of its own. Alternatively, an
article comparable in scope and style to the one on Stoic logic would have been an appropriate
choice. — Considering the fact that “Arabic Logic”, in this Volume of the Handbook, has as
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the subject “Aristotelian syllogistic in Arabic writings between 750 and 1350”, it is not clear
why “Arabic Logic” was included in the title of the book or why the articles on this subject
are not published in their appropriate historical context. Was this just an attempt to “sex
up” the title?
In addition to my remark on the absence of a chapter on China at the beginning of this
review, I want to make a short comment on the importance of Chinese logic. It is well
known that, long before Buddhist logic came from India, there existed also an indigenous
Chinese logic of the later Mohists around the 3rd century B.C. An introduction into this
subject as well as into the later Chinese Buddhist logic is given by Joseph Needham and
Christoph Harbsmeier, Science and civilisation in China, volume 7, Part I, Language and
Logic in Traditional China. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998. We agree
with Harbsmeier, who writes on p. xxi of that book: “The history of logic reﬂection in
China is therefore [because of its being based on a non-Indo-European language; K.G.] of
extraordinary interest for any global history of logic and hence for any global history of
the foundations of science.” The absence of a chapter on Chinese logic in the Handbook on
the history of logic must be considered as a lost opportunity which is not due to a lack of
literature on this subject (see also A. C. Graham, Later Mohist logic, ethics and science. The
Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1978).
The volume under review has an Index which is of limited value because references to the
chapters on Indian Logic, Stoic logic and on the last chapter are missing. Some chapters (e.g.,
Boger’s article) are troubled by typesetting errors which are too numerous to report here. On
p. 372, items 1–4 of a list are missing. An entertaining type of error occurs repeatedly in the
chapter on Stoic logic: “α	
 α	o  αα	  . . . ” (p. 413, see also pp. 411, 413,
415, and others), is not Greek, but English: “and another time against it . . . ”.
Notwithstanding these critical remarks, this Volume 1 of the “Handbook of the History
of Logic” is of value due to the excellent chapters by George Boger on Aristotle’s syllogistic
logic, by Robert R. O’Toole and Raymond E. Jennings on Stoic logic, and because of the two
chapters on Arabic Logic by Tony Street and Charles Burnett.
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